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  Competition from new store formats including supercenters, warehouse clubs, and mass mer-
chandisers has emerged as a major threat to traditional grocery chains. A primary objective of 
this paper is to understand how the store-level performance is related to the workforce com-
position of full-time and part-time employees chosen by the food retailer along with benefits 
and incentives provided to employees. The elasticity of complementarity for food retailers 
measures how changes in store size affect use of full-time and part-time employees. Larger 
store size increases the marginal value of labor, and firm hiring decisions shift to expanded 
use of part-time employees. 
 




The retail food industry has undergone significant 
changes since the 1980s as supermarkets have 
responded to increased competition from alterna-
tive retail formats and changes in consumer shop-
ping habits. Supermarkets have evolved from 
small, independently owned, full-service estab-
lishments to large, administratively centralized, 
horizontally and sometimes even vertically inte-
grated self-service chains. Competition from ware-
house clubs, mass merchandisers, supercenters, 
and convenience stores has intensified, forcing 
supermarkets to reevaluate many of the ways in 
which they conduct their business operations. As 
the size of the typical supermarket grew, not only 
in the United States but also in Europe, econo-
mists began to focus attention on economies of 
size and scale in food retailing. Paul Miller, in a 
1930 article in the American Journal of Agri-
cultural Economics, was perhaps the first agri-
cultural economist to examine the emergence of 
mass retailing by chain stores and the implica-
tions for growers and processors. 
  The importance of food retailing is also re-
flected in research initiatives highlighted on the 
Economic Research Service’s webpage,
1 includ-
ing public policy related to the structure of U.S. 
retail food markets and its impact on agricultural 
suppliers, financial performance, competition, and 
food market prices. Li, Sexton, and Xia (2006) 
discuss the extent of market power by retailers, 
noting that “we know rather little about retailers’ 
behavior in terms of choices of products and 
brands carried, pricing strategies promotions” (p. 
236), and the authors conclude that the impli-
cations for consumers and producers are not 
clear. 
  Wal-Mart, the world’s largest retailer, has per-
fected the supercenter format to become the 
leading firm in the grocery industry. From a base 
of only 10 in 1993, Wal-Mart now operates over 
2,195 supercenters, with company plans indicat-
ing that this store format will expand by 200 new 
stores every year for the next five years. Target 
was operating 177 SuperTarget locations as of 
January 2007. The supercenter format is identi-
fied as the major threat to traditional grocery 
chains, as close to 80 percent of supermarket 
managers listed competition from this store for-
mat as their major concern (National Grocers 
Association 2005). 
  A clear gap in the current work on the food 
retail sector is an analysis of the retail labor force 
and how hiring decisions and employment op-
portunities are related to retail performance and 
store-level decisions. Davis et al. (2006) exam-
ined human resource practices across retail food 
establishments and found that these practices are 
quite persistent even in the face of new external 
competition, such as entry by a new supercenter. 
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We extend this work by incorporating detailed 
store-level information on benefits and incentives 
that can be linked to store performance. Re-
searchers have assessed the impacts of new store 
formats such as “big box” stores on rural econo-
mies and local food stores’ sales and on commu-
nity social capital stocks (Goetz and Rupasingha 
2006, Artz and Stone 2006). 
  Food retailing and marketing researchers have 
examined the impact of supercenter entry on 
pricing strategies and profitability of incumbent 
supermarkets. The effects of changing product 
market competition on retailing employment 
trends have been addressed by Basker (2005), 
who found that Wal-Mart entry has a positive 
short-run effect on county retail employment that 
diminishes over time. While recognizing that Wal-
Mart supercenters compete directly with food re-
tailers, Basker does not make an attempt to 
quantify their direct effects on grocers. 
  Retailers are increasingly concerned about the 
link between workforce decisions and store-level 
performance measures such as value-added. In-
dustry publications comment on the “people gap” 
in food retailing that leads managers to “focus on 
today’s operating efficiencies at the expense of 
tomorrow’s front-line work force” (Major 2003, 
p. 245). Human resource managers have sug-
gested that the industry is not attracting the right 
mix of workers and will have to face significant 
turnover rates and increasing pressure on margins 
in future years. 
  The retail food industry recognizes the key role 
that employee benefits and incentives play in re-
taining employees and encouraging entry by pro-
spective workers. The 2003 Employee Benefits 
Study (Food Marketing Institute 2003) noted that 
a wide array of daily activities offered by success-
ful supermarkets including cashiering, bagging, 
stocking, pricing, merchandising, and buying rely 
on performance by well-trained employees. In-
dustry publications identify the scope and variety 
of benefits offered by food retailers and assess 
costs of benefits offered by food retail and distri-
bution industries. Our broader objective is to un-
derstand how the workforce composition of full-
time and part-time employees chosen by the food 
retailer along with employee benefits and incen-
tives impact store-level performance. 
  A production function approach based on a 
performance measure for supermarket operations 
is integrated with workforce characteristics and 
employee benefits and incentives offered by food 
retailers. The elasticity of complementarity meas-
ures the effect of a change in a relative input 
quantity (such as labor) on the relative input 
price, and flows directly from the estimation of a 
production function where input quantities are 
exogenous and input prices are endogenous. Sub-
stitution measures between inputs in food retail-
ing are derived and the factors that influence 
relative factor prices are assessed. Data for the 
study are from the Supermarket Panel conducted 
by The Food Industry Center (TFIC) at the Uni-
versity of Minnesota. The Panel is an annual sur-
vey of supermarkets where store managers pro-
vide information on store characteristics, opera-
tions, and performance. An empirical model is 
specified, and data collection procedures, char-
acteristics of the Panel, and results from the 
econometric model are presented. Discussion of 
the implications, along with directions for future 
research, conclude the paper. 
  The elasticity of complementarity is the appro-
priate measure used to assess key policy and 
competitive developments facing an industry such 
as food retailing. The impact of a tax incentive to 
encourage the supply of capital or hire specific 
types of workers depends on the Hicks elasticity. 
Seidman (1989) showed that a tax incentive to 
stimulate the use of capital benefits low-skilled 
labor if the two inputs are complements by the 
Hicks elasticity, highlighting the empirical rele-
vance of this measure. Regulatory strategies to 
deal with large-scale retail facilities (“big box” 
retailers) typically include municipal zoning ordi-
nances, which rely on size and height limitations 
on stores, conditional use restrictions, impact as-
sessments and development fees, and design guide-
lines for buildings, landscaping, and road access. 
The effects of these ordinances on relative factor 
prices for store square footage and employees are 
appropriately analyzed using the production frame-
work proposed here. 
  Most of the research on labor substitution pat-
terns examines workers characterized by demo-
graphic groups such as age-race-sex groups. Grant 
and Hamermesh (1981) examined groups such as 
youths, adult blacks, white women, and white 
men. Berger (1983) differentiated workers by sex 
along with years of schooling and years of experi-
ence. The model we develop focuses on the use 
of full-time and part-time workers, an important 
characteristic of the retail workforce. 290    October 2008  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Analysis of the Food Retailing Firm 
 
A key issue in the food retailing sector is under-
standing how the earnings of employees are in-
fluenced by store characteristics such as store size 
and the full-time and part-time workforce in the 
store. Hicks partial elasticities are designed to 
assess the response of relative factor prices to 
exogenous changes in relative factor quantities 
and to measure returns to factors of production 
such as earnings of employee groups. 
  The impacts of innovative store formats that 
have influenced food retailing can be measured 
using the elasticity of complementarity. Wal-Mart 
has introduced the Neighborhood Market as a 
new store format that “has the potential to revo-
lutionize United States retailing in the coming 
decade just as powerfully as discount stores did in 
the 1980s and supercenters are doing in the 
1990s” (Discount Store News 1999). Neighbor-
hood Markets are about one-quarter the size of 
typical supercenters (or about 40,000 square feet), 
stocking about one-fifth of the items (between 
20,000 to 23,000 items), and represent a modern 
version of the neighborhood grocery. The empha-
sis is on consumer convenience with ease of entry 
for quick shopping, and they feature fresh pro-
duce, dairy, and dry grocery departments, general 
merchandise, a one-hour photo center, and a drive-
through pharmacy. Big-box retailers including 
Wal-Mart, Target, Costco, and Home Depot are 
developing multi-level store formats to penetrate 
urban areas while combating sprawl and comply-
ing with strict zoning guidelines. 
  Consider a firm operating in perfectly competi-
tive product and factor markets with a production 
function based on a vector of inputs x which are 
transformed into a measure of store performance 
y (or output) described by the production function 
y = F(x). Facing nonrandom input prices, the firm 
seeks to minimize costs for a given output level. 
The Hicks elasticity of complementarity measures 
the response of an input price to a change in the 
input quantity where the shift in factor price is 
chosen to keep marginal cost and quantities of 
other factors constant. The elasticity of comple-
mentarity, 
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where Fi(x) = ∂F(x)/∂xi and Fij(x) = ∂F
2(x)/ 
∂xi ∂xj = Fji. Inputs i and j are defined to be gross 
q-complements in the production of a variable out-
put when 
H
ij ρ  > 0, or when an increase in the quan-
tity of input j increases the price (or marginal 
valuation) of input i. When 
H
ij ρ  < 0, inputs i and j 
are gross q-substitutes. The Hicks elasticities meas-
ure the gross effects of changes in input quantities 
on input prices and include both substitution and 
output effects. 
  The translog production function for the food 
retailing establishment is specified as 
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where z is a set of store-level organizational and 
operational factors that influence performance, 
and βij = βji. The production function is homoge-
neous of degree θ in the set of variable inputs x if 
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for all q. Constant returns to scale for the set of 
variable inputs in the specification is obtained 
when θ = 1. The partial production elasticity of 
















and the elasticity of scale is the sum of the partial 
production elasticities for the variable inputs, 
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The Hicks elasticities can be computed from the 
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Uncompensated quantity elasticities, ηij, or in-
verse price elasticities, are calculated along with 
the inverse output elasticities, ηiy, in the empirical 
results. The inverse price elasticities are 
















The inverse price elasticities measure the change 
in price of a factor (such as full-time labor) given 
a one percent change in the quantity of a factor 
(such as store size). The inverse output elasticities 











Sato and Koizumi (1973) demonstrated that the 
elasticity of complementarity can be related to 
factor prices, quantities, and the output share of a 
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where pi is the price of the ith factor and si is the 
share of output accruing to that factor. Major in-
fluences on changes in relative factor prices can 
be derived from equation (7) when all factor quan-
tities are allowed to adjust, as 
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Shifts in the relative earnings of full-time and 
part-time employees can be predicted given spe-
cific scenarios or assumptions about changes in 
quantities of each factor. 
 
Empirical Model of Supermarket Operations 
 
The Supermarket Panel is an annual, nationwide 
survey of supermarkets that collects data on store 
characteristics, operating practices, and perform-
ance. The Panel was established in 1998 by the 
Food Industry Center as a basis for ongoing study 
of the supermarket industry. Panel data booklets 
are mailed directly to store managers each Janu-
ary. Each respondent receives a customized bench-
mark report comparing his/her store to a peer 
group of stores similar in size and format. The 
Panel is unique because the unit of analysis is the 
individual store, and stores are tracked over time. 
In contrast, findings presented in the Annual 
Report of the Grocery Industry published by Pro-
gressive Grocer and the Food Marketing Insti-
tute’s annual SPEAKS report are based on com-
pany-level responses for representative stores. 
Data collection procedures for the 2002 Super-
market Panel, selected at random from the nearly 
32,000 supermarkets in the United States, are 
described in detail by King, Jacobson, and Seltzer 
(2002), and the variables for the model are pre-
sented in Table 1. 
  The translog production function for the food 
retail establishment is based on value-added as 
the output measure along with measures of the 
operational and environmental constraints facing 
the supermarket. Store performance depends on 
variable inputs for store size (SSize), the hiring of 
full-time labor (FTHrs), and part-time labor hours 
(PTHrs). The store-level organizational and op-
erational factors (zq) that influence performance 
are discussed below. A stochastic error term, as-
sumed to reflect errors in optimizing behavior, is 
added to the production function in equation (2). 
Estimation proceeds by maximum likelihood, as-
suming that the error term is an independently 
and identically distributed normal random vari-
able. 
  The output measure for the retail store is 
weekly gross margin or value-added, defined as 
weekly sales minus the cost of goods sold. Baily 
and Solow (2001) suggest that value-added gen-
erated by retailers is the best measure of retailing 
output. They note that the value-added measure 292    October 2008  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 1. Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics 




ValAdd  Value-added ($/week)  $56,556  $53,810  Q52, Q54 
SSize  Store selling area (square feet)  28,100  22,747  Q8 
FTHrs  Full-time labor (hours per week)  1032.9  909.7  Q20 
PTHrs  Part-time labor (hours per week)   896.7  785.9  Q20 
GSize   Ownership group size (number of stores)   199.3  536.9  Q14 
SelfDist  Membership in a self-distributing group, 1 if yes, 0 if no  0.37  0.48  Q15 
Union  At least 25 percent of employees covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement, 1 if yes, 0 if no 
0.23 0.42 Q25 
FTBen  Benefits offered to full-time employees   3.09  1.59  Q26 
FTIncen  Incentives offered to full-time employees   0.59  0.81  Q26 
PTBen  Benefits offered to part-time employees  1.5  1.74  Q26 
PTIncen  Incentives offered to part-time employees  0.44  0.71  Q26 
Convl  Conventional format, 1 if yes, 0 if no  0.64  0.48  Q30 
FoodDrug  Food/drug combination format, 1 if yes, 0 if no  0.23  0.42  Q30 
SCenter  Warehouse, Supercenter, Super Warehouse format, 1 if yes, 0 if no  0.09  0.29  Q30 
Superstore   Superstore format, 1 if yes, 0 if no  0.04  0.2  Q30 
a The question number for each variable in the 2002 Supermarket Panel Annual Report conducted by The Food Industry Center 
(TFIC) at the University of Minnesota. 
 
of output reflects the amount of retail services 
that are provided, such as the variety of merchan-
dise provided, convenience of store location, and 
availability of checkout and food department per-
sonnel, along with the availability of in-store 
services. 
  Results from summary income statements of 
conventional supermarkets confirm a close rela-
tionship between value-added measures and labor 
productivity at the store level. The Food Market-
ing Institute (2002) reported that the most profit-
able food retailers invested a higher percentage of 
expenses in personnel than did lower performing 
supermarkets, even though overall expenses for 
the top performers were lower than those for the 
least profitable stores. Payroll as a percentage of 
total expenses was at 47.5 percent for the most 
profitable stores and 41.9 percent for the least 
profitable stores. High performing stores use 
managerial skills and operational methods to con-
trol overall expenses more effectively and to main-
tain high gross margins. 
  The two inputs considered in this analysis are 
store selling area and weekly labor hours. Store 
selling area is a rough measure of the capital used 
in a retail operation. Store energy costs and other 
major capital inputs, such as refrigeration equip-
ment and lighting, shelving and display cases, and 
front-end checkout equipment, are highly corre-
lated with store selling area. 
  The impact of workforce quality and composi-
tion on retail performance is measured by the 
store’s use of full-time and part-time workers. 
The labor inputs are full-time labor hours (FTHrs) 
and part-time labor hours (PTHrs). Oi (1992) 
noted that reliance on part-time workers is an 
indicator of the skill mix of the retail work force. 
Increases in the ratio of part-time to full-time 
employees are driven partly by larger store sizes. 
But larger stores also pay higher wages than 
smaller stores because their employees supply 
more work effort. The result is that wages of part-
time workers are higher at larger supermarkets 
than at smaller stores. 
  Larger stores must hire more clerks, and these 
employees are more productive because they 
waste less time in waiting on customers. Full-time 
workers also benefit from higher wages at larger Park  Evaluating Labor Productivity in Food Retailing   293 
 
 
supermarkets. The key relationship to note is the 
size-wage premium: as stores get bigger, wages 
of part-time workers rise faster than wages of 
full-time workers. Oi (1992) concluded that pro-
ductivity gains associated with sales volume in 
food retailing are relatively greater for part-time 
employees. The empirical model allows us to 
evaluate the relative impact of full-time and part-
time employees on store performance as meas-
ured by value-added. 
  To test whether the benefits and the incentive 
packages offered to employees influence value-
added at the store level, a variable for these meas-
ures was formed. The Supermarket Panel re-
corded information on the typical compensation 
package for full-time and part-time workers where 
the category of full-time workers excluded de-
partment heads and store managers. Benefits in-
cluded individual health insurance, family health 
insurance, disability insurance, company-funded 
pension, and a 401(k) plan. The menu of incen-
tives offered by the firm indicated whether the 
firm offers an annual bonus, whether it uses 
individual performance incentive pay or incentive 
pay based on product or category performance, 
and the presence of an employee stock ownership 
plan. The benefits and incentives offered by food 
retailers are listed in Table 2. 
  The benefits variable for full-time (FTBen) and 
part-time (PTBen) employees was constructed as 
the number of benefits provided by the establish-
ment (from 1 to 5). The incentives measure for 
full-time (FTIncen) and part-time (PTIncen) em-
ployees was a count of the incentives offered 
(from 1 to 4). Our measures here are consistent 
with yet also more comprehensive than research 
(Decressin et al. 2004, Brown and Medoff 2003) 
on benefit offerings by firms that utilizes di-
chotomous indicators for whether firms provide 
benefits such as pensions, welfare plans (health, 
life, supplemental employment, and disability in-
surance), or fringe benefit plans. 
  On average, full-time employees received 3 of 
the 5 listed benefits and 0.59 of the 4 incentives, 
with part-time employees recording lower scores 
on both indicators. Four benefit measures were 
received by over 50 percent of full-time employ-
ees: individual health insurance, family health 
insurance, disability insurance, and the 401(k) 
plan. There were no incentives provided to more 
than half of the full-time employees, and none of 
the benefits or incentives were available to more 
than 50 percent of the part-time employees. The 
difference between benefits offered to full-time 
and part-time employees is dramatic and rein-
forces the importance of examining how these 
workers influence store performance. A large pro-
portion (45 percent) of part-time employees re-
ceive no benefits, matched by a similar proportion 
(46 percent) of full-time employees who receive 
four or more (maximum of 5) of the benefits. 
  The data confirm a clear correlation between 
store size and the provision of benefits and in-
centives for both full-time and part-time employ-
ees. Offerings of benefits and incentives tend to 
increase for both types of employees as store size 
increases. Stores with floorspace between 45,000 
and 60,000 square feet offer the most benefits and 
incentives for full-time workers, and the largest 
stores (over 60,000 square feet) provide the most 
extensive benefit set for part-time workers. 
  Characteristics of the organizations that own 
and operate stores may also impact gross margin, 
and four characteristics are featured in the model. 
First, membership in a larger group (Gsize) may 
boost productivity through multistore economies 
in procurement and advertising and through cen-
tralization of some managerial functions. Hoppe 
(2002) commented on established empirical find-
ings that large firms tend to adopt new technol-
ogy sooner than small firms, as the larger firms 
expect a greater rate of return from adoption. 
  The role of multiplant economies in the adop-
tion and diffusion of technological innovations in 
food retailing chains also influences technology 
adoption decisions. Multiplant firms may attain 
savings in nonproduction costs such as transpor-
tation, distribution, and inventory control while 
taking advantage of the economies of massed 
reserves along with information-sharing between 
plants. Jensen (2004) demonstrated how econo-
mies of multiplant operations influence the rela-
tionship between firm size and technology adop-
tion. If learning costs of new technology are 
greater for a large firm, the small firm can lead in 
adoption. However, if the profit increase accruing 
to the large firm with multiplant operations is 
large enough, the learning cost effect is overcome 
and the large firm is more likely to lead in tech-
nology adoption. Food retailing chains may bene-
fit from multiplant economies in the adoption and 
diffusion of technological innovations. 294    October 2008  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 2. Summary of Benefits and Incentives Offered by Food Retailers 
Abbreviation  Benefit or Incentive Full-Time  Part-Time 
IHINS  Individual health insurance  84.8  35.4 
FHINS  Family health insurance  73.0  25.8 
DINS  Disability insurance  55.4  25.5 
CFPEN  Pension 37.8  25.2 
401K  401(k) plan  57.8  38.1 
ANBON  Annual bonus  19.3  12.0 
IPIP  Individual performance incentive pay  16.7  15.2 
IPCP  Incentive pay linked to product / category performance  5.6  3.2 
ESOP  Employee stock ownership program  17.0  13.5 
Ben  IHINS + FHINS + DINS + CFPEN + 401K     
Incen  ANBON + IPIP + IPCP + ESOP     
a Data from the 2002 Supermarket Panel Annual Report conducted by The Food Industry Center (TFIC) at the University of Min-
nesota. The proportion of employees receiving the benefit or incentive is recorded in the table. 
 
  A second organizational descriptor is a binary 
variable equal to zero if the store is wholesaler-
supplied and equal to one if the store is part of a 
self-distributing group (SelfDist). Stores and dis-
tribution centers are under common ownership in 
self-distributing chains, facilitating coordination 
between these two segments of the retail supply 
chain and enhancing productivity gains. Stores in 
self-distributing groups, which account for about 
37 percent of the sampled stores, report a value-
added figure that is over 2.5 times higher than 
that recorded by wholesaler-supplied stores. Sales 
per square foot measures are about 25 percent 
higher ($8.92 vs. $7.19). Stores in self-distributing 
groups provide higher levels of benefits and in-
centives for both full-time and part-time workers. 
  Unionization is a third organizational factor 
that may affect productivity if having a unionized 
workforce is associated with significant differ-
ences in worker skills and/or workforce stability. 
A binary variable equal to one if at least a quarter 
of the workforce is covered by a collective bar-
gaining agreement (Union) and zero otherwise is 
also included in the empirical model, resulting in 
about 23 percent of the stores being identified as 
unionized. Unionized stores register high per-
formance for the value-added measure, with a 
dollar amount that is over 2 times higher than 
non-unionized stores. The sales per square foot 
measure for unionized stores is about 32 percent 
higher than for non-unionized stores. Hirsch (1991) 
reported a strong negative relationship between 
union coverage at the firm level and company 
earnings and market value for manufacturing 
firms, supporting the theory that unions appropri-
ate a share of the returns that accrue to profit-en-
hancing firms. Food retailing establishments dis-
play a different pattern, and it will be interesting 
to see if a positive relationship between unioniza-
tion and value-added is observed after controlling 
for key store-level variables. 
  Distribution service levels are closely related to 
store format, the fourth measure of store organi-
zation. King, Jacobson, and Seltzer (2002) report 
considerable variation in median store character-
istics and performance measures for stores 
grouped by format. Store format is not closely re-
lated to the hiring of full-time and part-time em-
ployees. Across each of the store formats, the 
ratio of full-time to part-time employees is gener-
ally unchanged, varying between 50–54 percent. 
The model examines whether these format effects 
can be accounted for by systematic differences in 
input levels and other productivity shifters across 
formats. Binary variables for these format catego-
ries are included in the empirical model. Stores in 
the Supermarket Panel are grouped into four mu-
tually exclusive, exhaustive format categories 
based on store size and distribution service of-
ferings. The store format categories include con-Park  Evaluating Labor Productivity in Food Retailing   295 
 
 
ventional stores, food/drug combinations, super-
centers, and warehouse/super-warehouse formats 





Discussion of the model results centers around 
two main issues. First, the key factors that influ-
ence retail store performance along with the esti-
mated partial production elasticities and measures 
of returns to scale are presented. Second, the im-
plications of the elasticities of complementarity 
for evaluating use of store inputs by food retailers 
are assessed. 
  Coefficient estimates and asymptotic standard 
errors based on heteroscedasticity robust standard 
errors for the translog model are presented in Ta-
ble 3. The empirical analysis follows Berger 
(1983), Grant and Hamermesh (1981), and Kim 
(2000), who relied on the ordinary least squares 
model in their applications. King and Park (2004) 
also provide support for the estimation approach 
in modeling productivity in supermarket opera-
tions. Benefits and incentive packages are closely 
linked to the size of the store along with staffing 
decisions, leading us to specify interactions be-
tween variables. The four store-level organiza-
tional and operational factors (group size, mem-
bership in a self-distributing group, unionization, 
and four store format indicators) enter the specifi-
cation as factors that shift value-added directly. 
  We examine whether the production function 
for food retailing is consistent with homotheticity, 
which implies that the marginal rate of technical 
substitution is homogeneous of degree zero in in-
puts by testing whether 
 
   0 ij
j
β = ∑ . 
 
Restrictions required for a homogeneous produc-
tion along with linear homogeneity are also 
tested. Both the homotheticity and homogeneity 
restrictions apply to the set of variable inputs con-
sidered in the model: store size, full-time labor, 
and part-time labor. 
  Hausman (1978) exogeneity tests of the benefit 
and incentive measures for full-time and part-time 
employees were conducted. Instruments included 
training hours for new hires in cashiers and other 
positions, hours of training for key employees 
(store managers, grocery department managers, 
and scanning coordinators), and store adoption of 
information technologies for data-sharing, deci-
sion-sharing technologies and practices, and tech-
nologies supporting product assortment, pricing, 
and merchandising decisions. The exogeneity hy-
pothesis for the benefits and incentives variables 
was not rejected. 
 The coefficients associated with the store 
categories indicate how supermarket performance 
across each format compares with the average su-
permarket in the sample. The null hypothesis that 
the format effects (conventional, food/drug com-
bination, supercenter, and warehouse/super ware-
house) are jointly equal to zero is not rejected, as 
the calculated χ
2 value of 0.256 was below the criti-
cal value 
2
3 χ  of 7.81 at the 95 percent confidence 
level. The store format variables were subse-
quently excluded from the model. 
  The Points of Impact Retail Operations Survey 
(National Grocers Association 2005) compiles 
average gross profits across different store for-
mats such as conventional, upscale, and discount 
supermarkets, and both upscale and conventional 
superstores. The annual report from the 2002 Su-
permarket Panel also noted the important effect 
that format has on store performance, comment-
ing that “food/drug combinations, warehouse, su-
perwarehouse, and supercenter/hypermarket stores 
have performance levels that are significantly dif-
ferent from (but not always better than) perform-
ance for stores with conventional and supermar-
ket formats.” The findings are useful for retail in-
dustry analysts as they suggest that after control-
ling for inputs such as store size and labor use 
(including benefits and incentives), store formats 
are not a significant component influencing ob-
served value-added. 
  The calculated returns to scale measure is 
1.013, which is not significantly higher than one, 
implying essentially constant returns to scale for 
the set of variable inputs (store space, full-time 
labor, and part-time labor). From the likelihood 
ratio tests presented in Table 3, the production 
function for the food retailing establishments 
does not reject the constant returns to scale re-
striction. The Hicks elasticity of complementarity 
is a theoretically valid measure to examine input 
substitution patterns for the food retailing estab-
lishments. Using an aggregate cost function for 296    October 2008  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 3. Production Function Parameter 
Estimates for Food Retailing Establishments 
Variable Estimate  T-ratio 
Intercept  -6.808* -2.354 
SSize  0.523 0.691 
FTHrs  -0.340 -0.628 
PTHrs  0.170 0.401 
SSize × SSize  -0.058 -0.952 
FTHrs × FTHrs  1.000* 2.007 
PTHrs × PTHrs  0.032* 2.630 
SSize × FTHrs  0.049 0.513 
SSize × PTHrs  0.067 1.146 
SSize × FTBen  0.044 1.257 
SSize × FTIncen  0.055 0.880 
SSize × PTBen  -0.061* -2.089 
SSize × PTIncen  0.024 0.414 
FTHrs × PTHrs  -0.141* -2.881 
FTHrs × FTBen  -0.040 -1.427 
FTHrs × FTIncen  -0.026 -0.523 
PTHrs × PTBen  0.058* 2.436 
PTHrs × PTIncen  -0.041 -0.867 
FTBen  -0.073 -0.300 
FTIncen  -0.340 -0.787 
PTBen  0.283 1.311 
PTIncen  0.032 0.067 
FTBen × FTBen  -0.010 -1.072 
FTIncen × FTIncen  -0.016 -0.468 
PTBen × PTBen  -0.012 -1.288 
PTIncen × PTIncen  0.005 0.132 
GSize  0.001 0.336 
SelfDist  0.093 1.603 
Union  0.163* 2.980 
RESTRICTIONS AND CRITICAL VALUE 
F-test for homotheticity  1.2029 (critical value F4, 320 = 2.37) 
F-test for homogeneity  1.1176 (critical value F5, 320 = 2.21) 
R-squared 0.89 
No. of observations  341 
Note: Asterisk indicates asymptotic t-values with significance 




U.S. retail food stores based on value-added at 
retail and three inputs including intermediate ser-
vices, capital, and labor, Ratchford (2003) found 
slightly decreasing returns to scale. Our results 
for returns to scale align with those reported by 
Betancourt and Malanoski (1999), who found con-
stant returns to scale with respect to output for a 
sample of U.S. supermarkets. Oi’s (1992) propo-
sition on economies of scale in which large stores 
are driven by lower operating costs is not con-
firmed by these results. 
  Labor expenses account for the largest propor-
tion of operating expenses, so food retailers are 
naturally interested in evaluating the impact of 
labor on value-added at the store level. Wages 
and benefits for store labor account for the largest 
component of operating expenses, at about 53 
percent of operating expenses. Occupancy (ex-
cluding utilities) ranks second, with an 11 percent 
share of operating expenses, followed by adver-
tising and promotion at 7 percent (Food Market-
ing Institute 2002). From the translog model, the 
partial production elasticities measure the change 
in store value-added in response to a one percent 
increase in labor used. The elasticity for full-time 
employees (0.43) is about 13 percent higher than 
that for part-time employees (0.38). Elasticities 
for the three inputs including store size (0.20) are 
each significantly different from zero. 
  The effect for membership in a self-distributing 
group indicates that these stores attain a value-
added which is about 9.7 percent higher than 
wholesaler-supplied stores, using Kennedy’s (1981) 
procedure to measure the impact of a dichoto-
mous variable on the logarithm of value-added. 
Retail analysts link the effectiveness of Wal-
Mart’s supercenters to its superior self-distribu-
tion network, while Kmart’s competitive disad-
vantages have been attributed in part to its lack of 
a self-distribution system. Self-distribution is rec-
ognized by retail analysts as a method to reduce 
supply chain costs and achieve greater efficiency, 
allowing stores to expand margins, improve in-
stock availability, and enhance store productivity. 
  Part-time employees in self-distributing chains 
are more productive than their counterparts in 
wholesaler-supplied operations based on the 
specified production function. The productivity of 
labor (both full-time and part-time) is, at 0.89, 
about 16 percent higher in stores in self-distrib-
uting chains, as compared with 0.77 for whole-
saler-supplied stores. The result is that self-dis-
tributing stores are able to generate greater changes 
in value-added for each unit of labor employed. Park  Evaluating Labor Productivity in Food Retailing   297 
 
 
  The union workforce binary variable showed a 
positive and significant relationship with im-
proved margins of about 17.7 percent, providing 
strong evidence that there are productivity gains 
associated with a union workforce. Unionization 
has a positive impact on value-added, providing 
strong evidence that there are productivity gains 
associated with having a union workforce. This 
result suggests some justification for higher wages 
for union workers, since the marginal product of 
labor, given the levels of selling area and total 
labor hours, is higher in stores with a union 
workforce. Farber and Saks (1980) noted that 
most analytical work on unions has concluded 
that unions generally raise the mean and lower the 
dispersion of the wage distribution within firms. 
Shifts in the intrafirm distribution of earnings due 
to unionization typically benefit workers at the 
lower end of the firm’s payscale. In the Su-
permarket Panel, the average wage bill for union 
establishments was about 10 percent higher than 
for nonunion food retailers, while the standard 
deviation of wages between the union establish-
ments was 66 percent lower than nonunion stores. 
The wage effects associated with unionization 
rates apparently have a positive impact on the 
value-added of food retailers. 
  Retailers providing an expanded set of benefits 
to full-time employees show higher performance, 
as the impact of benefits on store-level value-
added is statistically significant. The impact of 
benefits on value-added is evaluated in an elas-
ticity calculation, accounting for the interaction of 
the benefits variable with other explanatory vari-
ables in the model. An additional employee bene-
fit offered to both full-time and part-time em-
ployees adds about 4.0 percent to store-level 
value-added. 
  Empirical work in labor economics has docu-
mented a positive association between wages and 
benefits conditional on workforce characteristics. 
However, the result that firms offering expanded 
benefits to their workforce attain better perform-
ance is a new finding that aligns with emerging 
results from the labor economics literature. De-
cressin et al. (2004) show that firms offering bene-
fits are more likely to survive than firms that do 
not offer benefits, even after controlling for work-
force and firm characteristics. The results for the 
food retailing establishments do not show that 
value-added is positively influenced by an ex-
panded incentive package for either full-time or 
part-time workers. Retail managers can readily 
use these results to identify the optimal set of 
benefits and incentives to provide employees, 
with direct implications for improving store 
performance. 
  The own elasticities of complementarity calcu-
lated at the mean values of the explanatory vari-
ables (Table 4) are all negative, as required for a 
well-behaved production function. A positive 
elasticity between store size and part-time em-
ployees indicates that as store size increases, the 
marginal value of labor rises and firms hire more 
part-time employees, so these inputs are q-com-
plements. Store size and full-time workers are 
also q-complements, although the effect is not as 
large as that for the part-time workforce and is 
not statistically significant. 
  Inverse price elasticities and the inverse output 
elasticities evaluated at the means of the ex-
planatory variables are reported in Table 5. The 
price elasticity shows that a one percent increase 
in store size decreases the marginal cost of space 
by 1.59 percent, while increasing the marginal 
value of productivity (MVP), or the marginal 
revenue product, for both part-time and full-time 
workers. The own-quantity inverse price elastic-
ities for employees are small, indicating that in-
creases in the number of workers hired result in 
wage declines of less than one percent for both 
full-time and part-time employees (assuming 
flexible wages). Adjustments in payments to part-
time employees are larger than those to full-time 
workers. Store size has no significant effect on 
MVP of either full-time or part-time workers. 
  The expanded use of part-time workers leads to 
decreases in the valuation of full-time workers at 
the store level, leading to reduced employment of 
full-time workers. Negative signs for the esti-
mated inverse output elasticities imply that as 
value-added expands, the store places a lower 
value on additional units of the input. Changes in 
store value-added have a similar effect across 
each of the inputs. 
  The findings suggest that in evaluating labor 
market policies in food retailing, distinguishing 
between full-time and part-time employees is 
critical. Incorporating an expanded set of worker 
characteristics based on demographic groups may 
also be important, but utilizing information on 
workforce scheduling (full-time vs. part-time 
workers) reflects a key store-level decision avail-
able to managers in the retail sector. Store size 298    October 2008  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 4. Estimated Hicks Elasticities of Complementarity 
  With respect to quantity of ... 
Marginal Value of Productivity  SSize FTHrs  PTHrs 




















Table 5. Estimated Uncompensated Inverse Price Elasticities and Output Elasticities  
  With respect to quantity of ... 
Marginal Value of Productivity  SSize FTHrs  PTHrs  Inverse Output Elasticity 




























(capital) and both the labor groups used in the 
model are complements. Incentives that encour-
age retailers to expand employment by full-time 
and part-time workers will raise the marginal 
product, and therefore the rate of return to capital. 
 
Interpreting Labor Adjustment at the Store 
Level 
 
Additional information about labor adjustment 
can be gained by using the decomposition in 
equation (8) to predict the adjustments in wages 
for full-time and part-time employees in response 
to changes in store size. Consider the develop-
ment of the Neighborhood Market concept by 
Wal-Mart, which promotes a smaller store size 
(limited to about 40,000 square feet). The sce-
nario is based on the partial elasticities of com-
plementarity in Table 4, along with partial pro-
duction elasticities. 
  Changes in factor quantities for the scenario are 
derived from the Supermarket Panel, using mean 
store size and employee hours for stores which 
match the profile of Neighborhood Markets. 
Stores that are operating below the 40,000 square 
feet mark are assumed to adjust their inputs to 
match the Neighborhood Markets format. The 
predicted decrease in the relative earnings of full-
time versus part-time workers, or ∆ln(PFTHrs/ 
PPTHrs), is -0.213. Expanded employment of full-
time workers has a positive effect on the adjust-
ment in wages (0.168), but is outweighed by 
reductions in relative wages due to larger stores 
(-0.082) and lower demand for part-time employ-
ees (-0.299). Survey data from the Supermarket 
Panel allow a comparison of the relative use of 
full-time versus part-time labor in the two store 
formats (less than 40,000 square feet and more 
than 40,000 square feet). The ratio of full-time to 
part-time labor in stores below the 40,000 square 
feet mark is 80 percent, and shrinks to 37 percent Park  Evaluating Labor Productivity in Food Retailing   299 
 
 
for store sizes consistent with the Neighborhood 
Market concept. Larger stores employ more of 
both types of workers but shift to a greater reli-
ance on part-timers. 
  The Hicks elasticity and the decomposition 
allow us to evaluate changes in relative earnings, 
which are a key tool monitored by store manag-
ers, and the factors driving shifts in relative 
wages. An advantage of the production function 
approach which generates Hicks elasticities of 
complementarities is its flexibility in analyzing 
the impact of evolving trends in food retailing, 
particularly changes in relative factor prices. 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Retail managers are frequently interested in re-
lating store-level performance to specific man-
agement or human resource strategies. Berman 
and Evans (2001) outlined strategies available to 
retailers to enhance net profit margin (related to 
our value-added measure) and mentioned store-
level adjustments such as lowering labor costs, 
reducing costs by emphasizing self-service, or 
selling exclusive product lines. These strategies 
will involve changes in store size and the inten-
sity and relative use of full-time and part-time 
employees, which can be assessed using the Hicks 
elasticities of complementarity production func-
tion approach. 
  This study presents results from a production 
function analysis of supermarket operations, us-
ing a unique data set from a national survey of 
supermarkets. We place particular emphasis on 
modeling returns to scale and elasticities of com-
plementarity using a flexible functional form, 
linking these measures to store-level workforce 
decisions on benefits and incentives. The results 
confirm that the Hicks elasticity of complemen-
tarity is an appropriate measure to assess input 
substitutability for food retailers since the pro-
duction function exhibits constant returns to 
scale. 
  The empirical work documents that food retail-
ing firms that offer an expanded set of benefits 
[such as individual health insurance, family health 
insurance, disability insurance, company-funded 
pension, or a 401(k) plan] attain better perform-
ance. These findings address an important distinc-
tion in the menu of benefits offered to the retail 
workforce, as part-time workers receive very re-
stricted benefits compared to full-time employees. 
Retailers providing an expanded benefits set 
achieve higher performance, a finding which 
aligns with emerging results from the labor eco-
nomics literature. Retail managers could use these 
results to focus on identifying the optimal set of 
benefits for employees in order to improve store 
performance. 
  The detailed information on benefits and incen-
tives available in the Supermarket Panel high-
lights the value of store-level data from food re-
tailers collected with industry cooperation. Addi-
tional analysis can be conducted to establish 
whether the optimal menu of benefits and incen-
tives differs across size of store or should be ad-
justed for specific store formats. The detailed 
disaggregate data from the Supermarket Panel 
also indicates whether the benefits and incentives 
are provided to store managers, department heads, 
full-time workers, and part-time workers. This in-
formation could be exploited to assess the dif-
ferential effects across groups of workers and the 
impact of aligning benefits packages so that dif-
ferent employee groups receive a similar package 
of benefits. 
  Future work will expand the sample size by 
using updated versions of the Supermarket Panel. 
A primary goal will be to assess learning effects 
associated with changes in workforce composi-
tion between full-time and part-time employees, 
adjustments in benefits, and the role of turnover 
using data from multiple years. Finally, we plan 
to devote added attention to exploring the factors 
that underlie the strong productivity gains associ-
ated with membership in a self-distributing group, 
since questions about the importance of vertical 
coordination between stores and distribution cen-
ters will be critical to understanding the structural 
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